

**Beginning on October 27, 1787 the Federalist Papers were first published in the New York press under the signature of "Publius". These papers are generally considered to be one of the most important contributions to political thought made in America. The essays appeared in bookform in 1788, with an introduction by Hamilton. Subsequently they were printed in many editions and translated to several languages. The pseudonym "Publius" was used by three men: Jay, Madison and Hamilton. Jay was responsible for only a few of the 85 articles. The papers were meant to be influential in the campaign for the adoption of the Constitution by New York State. But the authors not only discussed the issues of the constitution, but also many general problems of politics.**

- [Introduction](#)
- [The Federalist 1](#) - General Introduction (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 2](#) - Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (Jay)
- [The Federalist 3](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Jay) (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
- [The Federalist 4](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Jay) (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
- [The Federalist 5](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Jay) (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
- [The Federalist 6](#) - Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 7](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)
- [The Federalist 8](#) - The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 9](#) - The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 10](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Madison) (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)
- [The Federalist 11](#) - The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 12](#) - The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 13](#) - Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 14](#) - Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered (Madison)
- [The Federalist 15](#) - The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 16](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
- [The Federalist 17](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
- [The Federalist 18](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton and Madison) (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
- [The Federalist 19](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton and Madison) (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
- [The Federalist 20](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton and Madison) (The Insufficiency of the Present

Confederation to Preserve the Union)

- [The Federalist 21](#) - Other Defects of the Present Confederation (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 22](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Other Defects of the Present Confederation)
- [The Federalist 23](#) - The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 24](#) - The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 25](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)
- [The Federalist 26](#) - The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 27](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
- [The Federalist 28](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
- [The Federalist 29](#) - Concerning the Militia (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 30](#) - Concerning the General Power of Taxation (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 31](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
- [The Federalist 32](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
- [The Federalist 33](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
- [The Federalist 34](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
- [The Federalist 35](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
- [The Federalist 36](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
- [The Federalist 37](#) - Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government (Madison)
- [The Federalist 38](#) - The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed (Madison)
- [The Federalist 39](#) - The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles (Madison)
- [The Federalist 40](#) - The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained (Madison)
- [The Federalist 41](#) - General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution (Madison)
- [The Federalist 42](#) - The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (Madison)
- [The Federalist 43](#) - The Same Subject Continued(The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered) (Madison)
- [The Federalist 44](#) - Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States (Madison)
- [The Federalist 45](#) - The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered (Madison)
- [The Federalist 46](#) - The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared (Madison)
- [The Federalist 47](#) - The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts (Madison)
- [The Federalist 48](#) - These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other (Madison)
- [The Federalist 49](#) - Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention (Hamilton or Madison)
- [The Federalist 50](#) - Periodical Appeals to the People Considered (Hamilton or Madison)
- [The Federalist 51](#) - The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments (Hamilton or Madison)
- [The Federalist 52](#) - The House of Representatives (Hamilton or Madison)
- [The Federalist 53](#) - The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives) (Hamilton or Madison)
- [The Federalist 54](#) - The Apportionment of Members Among the States (Hamilton or Madison)
- [The Federalist 55](#) - The Total Number of the House of Representatives (Hamilton or Madison)
- [The Federalist 56](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton or Madison) (The Total Number of the House of Representatives)
- [The Federalist 57](#) - The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many

Considered in Connection with Representation (Hamilton or Madison)

- [The Federalist 58](#) - Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered (Madison)
- [The Federalist 59](#) - Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 60](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 61](#) - The Same Subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
- [The Federalist 62](#) - The Senate (Hamilton or Madison)
- [The Federalist 63](#) - The Senate Continued (Hamilton or Madison)
- [The Federalist 64](#) - The Powers of the Senate (Jay)
- [The Federalist 65](#) - The Powers of the Senate Continued (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 66](#) - Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 67](#) - The Executive Department (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 68](#) - The Mode of Electing the President (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 69](#) - The Real Character of the Executive (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 70a](#) - The Executive Department Further Considered (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 70b](#) - The Executive Department Further Considered (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 71](#) - The Duration in Office of the Executive (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 72](#) - The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 73](#) - The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 74](#) - The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 75](#) - The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 76](#) - The Appointing Power of the Executive (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 77](#) - The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 78](#) - The Judiciary Department (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 79](#) - The Judiciary Continued (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 80](#) - The Powers of the Judiciary (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 81](#) - The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 82](#) - The Judiciary Continued (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 83](#) - The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 84](#) - Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered (Hamilton)
- [The Federalist 85](#) - Concluding Remarks (Hamilton)

This page comes from

Missouri Prepping:

<http://www.missouriprepping.com>

The URL for this page is:

<http://www.missouriprepping.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=3>